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LIFE AND ACTUALITY: ON PLACING 




Abstract: This paper looks at dialectical inferences as they relate to Hegel’s modal metaphysics, 
closely examining the Actuality section of Hegel’s Science of Logic and positing a reading of Hegel’s 
modal actualism that engages with two strains of secondary commentary. Responding to 
commentators, we make the case that Hegel’s ‘das Logische’ avoids presupposing possibility’s 
being prior to actuality insofar as actuality and the derivation of possibility is considered as the 
in-itselfness of actuality, an implicit inner moment whereby actuality further determines itself. 
Actuality is immediate yet derived as an identity from the logic of inner and outer. If actuality as 
immediacy is explicit/outer, then its opposition, its implicitness/innerness, has to be possibility 
in the logic of modality. In order to conceive of actuality as existence, and particularly as an 
emerging process, we must already conceive the problem of presupposing an alien form within 




In this paper, we will first place Hegel’s ‘das Logische’—and, in particular, Hegel’s 
modal metaphysics as they relate to it—as per his mature system, via exegetical 
discussion, situating Hegel qua Kant and Aristotle in particular. We will then, in 
subsequent sections, be able to move forwards by heeding these lessons and 
seeing what they offer insofar as recent secondary literature is concerned. We will 
also heed how Hegel’s a priori schema of life is related to Hegel’s logic of actuality. 
I 
As demonstrated by the Introduction of the Logic, Hegel takes up the 
consideration of objective thinking, the content of pure science, wherein the content 
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that corresponds to absolute truth is not external to the form. Rather, absolute 
truth judges objectively and determines external objectivity absolutely. Thus, the 
content of pure logical science takes as matter that “the form is nothing external, 
because this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself.”1 
For Hegel change itself is the true reality of thinking in its actuality. Kant’s 
transcendental constructivist turn is radicalized by Hegel, for once the object is 
thought its content is transformed, with the thought-object’s content made 
distinct in and by thought.2 Contra immediacy’s givenness—where a static object 
is reflected from the outside world and putatively reproduced as an exact mental 
representation in the thought-object—Hegel theorizes thought as necessarily 
transforming what it thinks; accordingly, truth is that which results from a 
fundamental alteration. Logical forms are not discrete, static entities but 
correspond to the continual movement of history and social reality.3 
For Kant, the rules of logic derive their necessary character via their relation 
to the original synthetic unity of apperception—in §16 of the Transcendental 
Deduction, Kant remarks that “[t]he synthetic unity of apperception is therefore 
the highest point to which we must ascribe all use of the understanding, even the 
whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy” (B133n).4 
Hegel praised Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception as the source of both 
the unity of intuition, i.e., the transcendental imagination, and the unity of 
concept, i.e., the unity of consciousness that accompanies all general concepts (or 
the analytic unity of apperception) as “one of the profoundest and truest insights” 
of the first Critique (SL 515).5 However, Hegel’s revision offers an a priori 
 
1 G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic [hereafter: SL], ed. and trans. George di Giovanni (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 29/21.34. 
2 Angelica Nuzzo, “Dialectical Reason and Necessary Conflict: Understanding and the Nature of 
Terror,” Cosmos and History vol. 3, no. 2-3 (2007): 292. 
3 Nuzzo thus underscores that Hegel’s logical forms “are, objectively, a historical reality—that is, a 
reality characterized by processuality and continuous transformation; and they are, subjectively, the 
functions or activities that institute our historical and social reality.” See: “Vagueness and Meaning 
Variance in Hegel’s Logic” in Hegel and the Analytic Tradition, ed. Angelica Nuzzo (New York: Continuum, 
2010), 64. 
4 References to Kant’s texts are made by citing the volume and page numbers of the so-called 
“Akademie- Ausgabe” of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften [AA] (Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter, 1902 ff.). References 
to the Critique of Pure Reason use the pagination of the original first [A] and second [B] editions. 
Translations are taken from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, edited by P. Guyer and A. 
Wood (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992 ff.). I occasionally modify the translations. 
5 Science of Logic, trans. George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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determination of the categories as necessary for determining any possible object, 
these objects grounded in the Concept (der Begriff). Shedding the first-person “I” 
behind Kant’s “I think”—Kant’s condition for cognition, or Transcendental 
Unity of Apperception, which, via the Synthetic Unity of Apperception, 
accompanies all representations—Hegel’s objective logic opens the aperture of 
the cognition of thought so as to delegate considerations regarding the formal 
side of consciousness. Thinking, for Hegel, neither correspond to the “I think’s” 
transcendental function nor a “psychological instance of subjectivity or 
consciousness.”6 Thus, “the finite determinateness in which that form is as ‘I’, as 
consciousness, must be shed” and “the form, when thought out in its purity, will 
then have within itself the capacity to determine itself, that is to give itself a 
content, and to give it as a necessary content—as a system of thought-
determinations” (SL 42). Contra Kant, Hegel theorizes the Concept as not 
something merely represented in thought or constructed on the basis of the 
reception of sense-data but an activity of self-determination immanently present 
to the self, wherein the subject/object ontological divide recedes. 
Examining the necessary structure of thought-determinations, Hegel thereby 
recalls the project of Aristotle’s categories, which deal with being qua thoughts 
about being, carrying forward a categorial investigation that could subsist 
independently from considerations regarding the logic of judgments and the logic 
of inferences. Hegel’s logic, unlike Kant’s preceding transcendental logic—which 
deals with the “isolated” occupation of thought-determinations—brings to bear 
a logic that “takes the place rather of the former metaphysics which was supposed 
to be the scientific edifice of the world as constructed by thoughts alone” (SL 42). 
For Kant, deducing the categories can solely by carried out by investigating the 
forms of judgments we make about the world (A79–80/B105). Indeed, Kant’s 
categories are subjective in the first instance, for Kant had rescinded the 
possibility of conceiving the world in structural terms of the “in itself,” therein 
transmogrifying the Aristotelian project of the categories by presenting thought 
abstracted from being and ultimately concerned with thought requisite to 
objective knowledge, where the latter is canalized by subject-relative 
appearances. Analyzing thought-determinations by tracing the conceptual 
 
6 Nuzzo, “Vagueness and Meaning Variance,” 63. 
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structure inherent to being, Hegel’s project conceives of any inquiry into 
judgment’s conceptual form as inextricably linked to questions of a judgment’s 
content. Hegel illuminates a structure that “would be there regardless of whether 
or not we were there to think about it.”7  
Hegel conceives of the lineage containing traditional formal logic—spanning 
from Aristotelian syllogistic logic to Leibniz’s logical calculi—and Kant’s 
transcendental logic to Hegel’s own dialectic-speculative logic as a progression, 
with Hegel’s system directed at the same fundamental issue(s) as those prior to 
him while also inaugurating a break with the logical manuals of his day. Hegel's 
logic, in comparison to the logic and metaphysics of his times, aims to proffer a 
truly scientific treatment, restoring natural life to logic. As Angelica Nuzzo notes, 
“as much as the overcoming of formal logic indicates the stance of leaving its 
abstract formality and formalism behind, it also implies a crucial inheritance that 
remains at the basis of such new projects [....] Hegel’s logic [...] may somehow 
even share the notion of formality with general logic against Kant.”8 Hegel’s 
dialectical-speculative logic, framed from its outset as a logic of transformation 
and process “in which contradiction plays a fundamental role in the pursuit of 
truth,”9 has a shared interest in objectivity with those traditional formal logics 
while overcoming the fixations of the Verstandeslogik, i.e., “logic of the 
understanding” (traditional formal logic and Kant’s transcendental logic) and its 
flaws in grasping change. Consequently, Hegel motivates the dialectical idea of 
contradiction against traditional and Kantian Verstandeslogik—as a first 
philosophy, Hegel’s das Logische galvanizes the linguistic, logico-natural elements 
in which we already live and speak.10 
Method thus takes center stage, and, in logical content and logical 
presentation (Darstellung), Hegel’s dialectical-speculative method evinces that 
neither content nor method can be assumed as given at the beginning of the 
logical science’s investigation. This is enumerated by the presuppositionless 
 
7 Paul Redding, “Actualist versus Naturalist and Conceptual Realist Interpretations of Hegel's 
Metaphysics” (forthcoming).  
8 Nuzzo, “Method in Hegel’s Dialectic-Speculative Logic" in The Palgrave Hegel Handbook, eds. Kenneth 
Westphal and Marina Bykova (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 153 [my emphasis]. 
9 Angelica Nuzzo, Approaching Hegel’s Logic Obliquely (Albany, SUNY Press: 2018), 30 [my emphasis]. 
10 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectics: Five Hermeneutical Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1976) 78. In using “das Logische,” I take up Nuzzo’s Hegel’s distinction between “logic” and “the logical.” 
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opening of the Logic, where Hegel deals with the question of being and 
nothingness. Hegel argues that being is the presuppositionless and indeterminate 
foundation for the development of determinate meaning. Being makes 
indeterminacy prior to contradiction and is completely inclusive, at once all 
comprehensive and empty—thus it is presuppositionless: “[O]ne should say that 
the beginning is to be made, not with the beginning, but directly with the fact 
itself, well then, this subject matter is nothing else than that empty being [which] 
…. science … cannot presuppose to know in advance.” (SL 53)  
Consequently, being, “considered as irreducible to pure thought” and “the 
absolute self-relation which is also pure thought,” is irreducible being, a mere self-
relation—it is not that thought lacks being but, rather, that it “lacks 
determination.”11 On the one hand, being contains no difference, since to contain 
difference would mean to generate determinateness and exclusion. On the other 
hand, being cannot be differentiated from that which does contain difference 
within it. Thus, we can describe being as that which all things indiscriminately 
are—as their most basic qualification and that which is so full that nothing can 
exceed it. Hegel remarks that “that which begins already is, but is also just as 
much not yet. The opposites, being and non-being, are therefore in immediate 
union in it; or the beginning is their undifferentiated unity” (SL 51).  
In turn, Hegel's conception of pure being fails to be meaningful—and, thus, 
is presuppositionless—since meaning requires distinction and difference. 
However, being vanishes (or, as Hegel puts it, has already vanished) into nothing 
(Nichts) due to its pure indeterminacy (SL 81). Being does not become nothing, it 
is already nothing. Becoming is the movement of thought that swings from being 
to nothing and from nothing to being. If becoming were the mediating term 
between being and nothing, then Hegel should have taken up becoming prior to 
his consideration of nothing and immediately after being. But, in reading Hegel’s 
Introduction chronologically, and thus adhering to the immanent flow of his 
presuppositionless science, becoming comes after nothing, with Hegel indicating 
that becoming is not a mediation for or of being and nothing. Being and nothing 
prove themselves to be becoming, for the former lacks content and determinacy—
that is, it is indeterminate being. It is not that the concept "nothing" is the opposite, 
 
11 Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence (Albany, SUNY Press: 1997), 187. 
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exterior, and external contrast of being, but merely equal to it: “[n]othing is 
therefore the same determination or rather absence of determination, and thus 
altogether the same as what pure being is” (SL 59). Being and nothing demonstrate 
that they are not external to one another but “ineliminable,” and therefore 
“dialectically immanent,” precisely because each one “vanishes” into, and 
thereby “revives,” the other—as the truth (Wahrheit) of being and nothing 
themselves, “becoming” is what each logically proves to be “as their truth” (SL 
80).12 
How do we get the inner self-movement of content from this 
presuppositionless Introduction? Hegel writes: 
“As yet there is nothing, and something is supposed to become. The beginning is 
not pure nothing but a nothing, rather, from which something is to proceed; also 
being, therefore, is already contained in the beginning. Therefore, the beginning 
contains both, being and nothing; it is the unity of being and nothing, or is non-
being which is at the same time being, and being which is at the same time non-
being” (SL 51). 
 Vis-a-vis the compound concept “becoming," which serves as both the 
derivative and starting point of being and nothing, Hegel changes emphasis from 
the positive concepts being and nothing to the process of transition between the 
two. Being and nothing form totality through negation, where the exhaustion and 
completion of all determinate possibilities is the result of otherness. By containing 
being and nothing in their “moments,” becoming retains the distinction between 
the while simultaneously relating them to one another—as a unique category, 
becoming unites the first two, proffering a new processual cycle that commences 
through an internally articulated mode where what starts as the seemingly 
“simple” concept being, by the end of the complete work, unspools as “the Idea,” 
which, given its mobility, is “the adequate concept, the objectively true, or the 
true as such” (SL 670). Contra the “simple idea,” which is but a  “subjective 
representation devoid of any content of reality,” the Hegelian Idea designates the 
rational makeup of objectivity, “for the externality has being only as determined 
by the concept and as taken up into its negativity” (SL 674). Reason thus 
presented is couched into materiality, deracinated from any subjective faculty or 
anthropological determination, designating the “process by which subjectivity 
 
12 Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic (West Lafayette: Purdue, 2005), 284. 
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and objectivity, thought and worldly reality, infinitely overlap without ever being 
completely identical, which would be the death of all thought.”13  
With immediacy as its first causality and presupposing neither its method nor 
concept, Hegel Logic must remain presuppositionless and when moving forward 
take only that which its previous moments internally necessitated. Hegel’s 
absolute method and its own inner necessity, in overcoming the modalities of 
skepticism via the Idea, finds its strength as a product of its necessity; the internal 
determinations of the method of the Logic being without presupposition proceed 
according to that which is internally necessitated. Accordingly, the Logic is guided 
by a deeper purposiveness at work, which is necessarily prior to the Idea as its 
logical ground—constituting itself from the very outset of the logic—and by 
which it allows the Idea to emerge as intensive infinite, embracing nature’s radical 
exteriority as the “final result and completion of its whole treatment" (SL, 31). 
On the Teleology section, Hegel remarks on Kant’s conception of internal 
purposiveness: 
“One of Kant’s greatest services to philosophy was in drawing the distinction 
between relative or external purposiveness and internal purposiveness; in the latter 
he opened up the concept of life, the idea, and with that he positively raised 
philosophy above the determinations of reflection and the relative world of 
metaphysics, something that the Critique of Reason does only imperfectly, 
ambiguously, and only negatively…. the opposition of teleology and mechanism is 
first of all the general opposition of freedom and necessity.” (SL 654) 
What Kant calls “transcendental logic” is not an account of the formal rules 
of thinking regardless of the content—i.e., general logic—but an account of “the 
rules of the pure thought of an object” (A55/B80). Hegel’s overcoming of the 
Kantian distinction between transcendental and general logic is achieved 
wherein Hegel shows that there can be no coherent account of the pure forms of 
thought (general logic) that is not already an account of the pure forms of things 
(transcendental logic); consequently, Hegel links Kant’s distinction between 
transcendental and general logic to his subjectivism (SL 40). In the Logic, Hegel 
is not simply running transcendental logic and general logic together and 
attempting to derive things themselves from thought, as in the rationalist 
tradition—Hegel’s radicalization is of Kant’s strategy in the metaphysical 
 
13 Jean-Francois Kervegan, The Actual and the Rational (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 20. 
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deduction, whereby we do not just derive our “conceptual scheme” but the 
categorial form of being itself, in light of which any empirical being is in principle 
thinkable. Hegel’s rewriting of the metaphysical deduction is an “immanent 
deduction” of the concept, which provides the constitutive character of inner 
purposiveness for any account of self-conscious conceptual activity vis-a-vis the 
content and determination of the Concept, which is provided on the basis of the 
metaphysical deduction, i.e., via the determinate content of being itself (SL 514). 
As seen above, Hegel conceives of the logical concept of life 
(Lebensformtätigkeit) as a presupposition of self-conscious cognition wherein life 
is a necessary condition of self-consciousness, not as a matter of empirical, causal, 
or natural necessity, but as a matter of a priori necessity (SL 676). Hegel’s project 
of the purposiveness of nature theorizes the reciprocal relation between causes 
and effects internal to an object, a form of self-organization distinctly 
characteristic of living organisms that.14 Consequently Hegel models his concept 
of spirit along internal purposiveness by identifying reason with purposive activity 
rather than ideas of design or intentionality (PN §245Z). Contra the teleologically-
determined and instrumentally-fixed principle of external purposiveness, which 
is modeled on artifact creation, internal purposiveness, modeled on organic 
activity and form, distinguishes between the mechanical law-laden order and that 
which is characteristic of life but precedes normative inference: self-maintenance, 
self-reproduction, and the reproduction of kind. Consequently, inner 
purposiveness is the engine which actualizes a species-concept (Gattung). Insofar 
as Hegel’s dialectical-speculative program culls to “life” an absolute system that 
follows thought’s immanent and self-moving process, working against those 
“empty, dead forms” that speak nothing to normativity and the content of life, 
the immediate Idea as “life” imbues “metaphysical significance” to Hegel’s 
project (SL, 27). Logical forms necessary permeate our reasoning, patterning our 
“concrete talking with each other,” and our “understanding each other,” which 
are laden with “concrete integuments” such that the task of Hegel’s logic, as 
theory and science, is to make those unconscious, implicit, and impure uses of 
the forms “conscious, explicit and pure.”15  
 
14 Karen Ng, Hegel’s Concept of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 68. 
15 Elena Ficara, "Hegel on the Naturalness of Logic," Argumenta 4, no. 2 (2019): 54. 
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II 
There are varied interpretations regarding Hegel’s idea of the necessity of 
contingency. Let us briefly review some of these interpretations, which will 
inform how existence and actuality unfold vide actuality when approaching 
Hegel’s modal metaphysics.  
There are those who claim that the presupposition Hegel coheres to is 
internally self-referencing, whereby the opening of the Logic is not entirely 
presuppositionless, i.e., is partially presupposed. Dieter Henrich reasons that 
Hegel’s transition lies in conceptions of Essence and the Concept—for Henrich, 
the movement from being to nothing can take place solely if the categories and 
ways of being that take place in the doctrine of being presuppose difference, 
which is retrofitted from the doctrine of essence, and integration, vis-à-vis the 
doctrine of the concept. That negation negates itself means not only that negation 
requires content in order to be negation but that it is, in some fundamental sense, 
“autonomous.”16 William Maker's Philosophy without Foundations describes Hegel’s 
Phenomenology and the deduction of the Concept as a self-sublating mediation or 
presupposition for the Logic, whereby “[o]nly if the Phenomenology as the 
presupposition for the Logic is understood to have a radically negative outcome 
can we reconcile … and also understand Hegel's description of the Phenomenology 
as a self-sublating mediation or presupposition for science.”17 Maker makes the 
case that the Phenomenology razes assumptions of consciousness and subject-object 
dualism, motivating the putative “transition” from being to nothing.  
Others read Hegel as heralding a pre-conceived conception of becoming, 
citing becoming as the source of the “transition” and part of a triad, insofar as it 
is what results from the dual transformations of being-into-nothing (ceasing-to-
be) and of nothing-into-being (coming-to-be). Becoming thus is regarded as the 
key in the triad and the Logic writ large—rather than a self-determined object 
that demonstrates what thought requires, this reading affirms “a Heraclitean 
vision of a ceaselessly changing reality” of being that is made necessary from 
Parmenides’ conception of pure being, “refined” via the immediacy of being 
itself—determinate being is consequently considered an examination of what it 
 
16 Dieter Henrich, “Anfang und Methode der Logik,” in Hegel im Kontext, ed. Dieter Henrich (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 73–94. 
17 William Maker, Philosophy Without Foundations (Albany: SUNY, 1994), 76. 
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means to become.18 Yet, such a reading elides that becoming appears sequentially 
after the transition from being to nothing—becoming is not a mediating or 
antecedent term.19 This reading argues that becoming relies on being and 
nothing as its internal source, eluding how being transitions into nothing prior to 
its subsequent transition into becoming. 
On the other hand are those who argue that Hegel is misguided to remark 
that the Logic is truly presuppositionless because all movement whatsoever 
requires an external source or cause. Those interlocutors who look beyond the 
Logic’s internal movements include Schelling, Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard—
they argue that the movement from being to nothing is artificial because it 
requires a presupposition in a thinking subject who does the work of moving 
concepts along. In charging Hegel with artificially couching a subject into the 
Logic—one who attempts to think being and who finds only empty thoughts from 
this intuition, and who ultimately does the work of synthesizing being and nothing 
into the higher concept of becoming—such interpreters claim that Hegel is wrong 
to assert that the opening of the Logic is truly presuppositionless, for this 
necessarily posits the external reflection of a thinking subject. Yet this 
interpretation similarly elides one of the Logic's most important insights: the 
“logical character” of Hegel’s categories investigate themselves “not because of the 
way we think of them or experience them.”20 This is precisely why Hegel presents 
us with an “I think” devoid of an intermediating “I.”   
Houlgate’s formulation is valuable for considering Hegel’s modal metaphysics. 
Houlgate notes that “[t]he real beginning of Hegel’s Logic—that is to say, its 
principle or ‘supporting ground’—is thus not the concept of pure being but that 
of becoming (as actuality).”21 In regarding pure being without internal diversity 
and reading Hegel without presuppositions, we—contra Schelling, Feuerbach, 
 
18 Robert Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 189. 
19 Likewise, those interpreters who make the case that Hegel presupposes Aufhebung make a similar mistake, 
for it is not until “Sublation of Becoming,” where we see Aufhebung emerge as the opposite of nothing: 
“What is sublated does not thereby turn into nothing. Nothing is the immediate; something sublated is on the 
contrary something mediated; it is something non-existent but as a result that has proceeded from a being; it 
still has in itself, therefore, the determination from which it derives …. That which is sublated is thus something  at 
the same tiem preserved, something that has lost its immediacy  but has not come to nothing for that” (SL 
81-82). 
20 Houlgate, Opening, 274. 
21 Ibid., 107. 
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Gadamer, etc.—recall the immediacy of das Logische, insofar as language “does, 
indeed, enable us to bring to mind an utterly presuppositionless conception of 
being (and to think the purely autonomous, logical development of that 
conception into further categories).”22 Self-critical philosophy begins by 
suspending all presuppositions about, and determinate conceptions of, thought 
and being so as to demonstrate how categories both determine their own limits 
and their own inadequacies, making themselves subject to autonomous, 
immanent critique. Speculative critique, as a process of cognition, unfurls “the 
activity of the forms of thinking, and the critique of them, [which] must be united 
within the process of cognition….forms of thinking must be considered in and for 
themselves” (EL 82/§4).23  
We have considered the Logic’s opening with local and global regard as it will 
be critical as we proceed to actuality. Actuality exhibits the essential form of self-
determination and is separate from mere existence. While what merely exists has 
the essential form of contingency and exhibits an external relation between form 
and content, what is actual displays a necessary connection between form and 
content, making what is actual grounded and rational. Actuality, for Hegel, is 
meant to describe the essential relation that obtains between essence and 
appearance in the determination of anything actual (SL 464; EL §142). In turn, 
the identification of something as actual indicates the presence of rational form—
if form constitutes what is actual, then to understand actuality we must 
understand the process and activity of actualization. Hegel's Aristotelian 
approach—indeed, Hegel’s conception of purposiveness is highly indebted to 
Aristotle’s ènérgeia—to actuality leads him to tether problems of form and 
activity together such that neither can be understood without reference to the 
other, whereby actuality represents the unity of essence and appearance, bringing 
us from the doctrine of essence to the doctrine of the Concept. 
III 
Insofar as traditional readings of Hegel’s Actuality chapter are concerned—
 
22 Ibid., 82. 
23 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, Part I of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze, Trans. 
T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991). 
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chiefly in the works of Burbidge, di Giovanni, Henrich, and Houlgate—the 
conclusion argues for the necessity of contingency in Hegel’s system. Recently, 
interlocutors such as Paul Redding, Franca D’Agostina, Elena Ficara, Gregory S. 
Moss, and Nahum Brown, amongst others, have taken up the question of Hegel’s 
logic and its relationship to contemporary nontraditional logics such as alethic 
realism, dialethism, and para-consistent logics. Both traditions take seriously the 
self-reflexive and dialectical nature of thought, seeing Aufhebung as overcoming, 
maintaining, and unifying two opposites, while heralding the life that Hegel 
breathes into the “dead forms” that preceded him, regarding das Logische as 
motivated by the genuine form of truth that the Concept prods. Despite sundry 
positions, with the latter group it is Hegel’s engagement with Aristotle’s Principle 
of Non-Contradiction that takes center stage. Due to the limited space of this 
article, we will hone in on Brown’s reading, offer a critique that heralds the lessons 
of the traditional reading, and ultimately gesture towards a corrective that, in the 
spirit of Hegel’s Aufhebung, overcomes, maintains, and unifies the best of both. 
Brown’s thought is interesting as he argues that the process of dialectical thinking 
amounts to thinking the genuine existence of contradiction. For Brown, it is 
thought that actualizes both (the negative and positive) sides of possibility at once, 
raising the status of unactualized possibility to the status of actuality. 
Insofar as Hegel's immanent deduction of the Concept as presented in the 
transition from the Doctrine of Essence to the Doctrine of the Concept is 
concerned, the Actuality chapter draws forth the necessity of contingency and 
can be read within a framework of modal actuality—this immanent deduction 
brings forth the constitutive character of inner purposiveness for any account of 
self-conscious conceptual activity whereby determinations of thinking have the 
power to determine actuality, but within the register of form. That is, one might 
read the Actuality chapter as drawing forth the immanent transformation from 
substance to subject, and from necessity to freedom and self-determination. 
Rather than commit to the immanent totality of the possible where thought 
actualizes mere possibilities, actuality’s determining itself through negativity 
engages with a transformation that takes place by means of an investigation into 
the concept of actuality, where the process of actualization is conceived of in 
terms of self-actualization.24  
 
24 Ng, Concept of Life, 127. 
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In understanding the activity of form in terms of purposiveness, the genesis of 
the Concept arises from and is an actualization of purposive activity, 
demonstrating the reciprocity and speculative identity between life and the self-
conscious Concept. Hegel's Concept thus continues to develop and transform 
Kant's purposiveness thesis by introducing a distinctive notion of actuality 
(Wirklichkeit), which finds its most complete treatment in the transition from 
Objective to Subjective Logic. Key to this transition is the "activity of form” 
(Formtätigkeit), which prompts the genesis of the Concept—the activity of form is 
Hegel’s take on the purposiveness of form. Notably, Hegel develops this by 
critically engaging with Spinoza's infinite, self-causing, and necessary absolute 
substance—which constitutes the essence and existence of all reality. Here we 
have Hegel’s substance-as-reflection, or reflection-as-substance, where freedom 
of the self-developing Concept results from the reflection of necessity as it is 
thought—this is manifest in Hegel’s conception of reciprocity/reciprocal action 
(Wechselwirkun). Perhaps most critical is Hegel’s engagement with Aristotle's 
conception of actuality. Pace Aristotle’s modal priority, potentiality and actuality 
exist via the same plane but are distinguished in regards to priority—this is a 
consequence of Aristotle grounding Plato’s eidos and collapsing the two-world 
model into a one-world model, Plato’s forms now essences of scientific 
investigation. Hegel’s critical engagements proffer actuality as activity and 
movement, and the priority of modes over substance; a constitutive alternative to 
Kant's idea of a natural purpose (Naturzweck), the purposiveness of the Concept 
reflects self-organizing form, unifying the three moments of Hegel’s Concept 
(universality, particularity, individuality). Consequently, the process of 
actualization can be understood as being a cause and effect of itself, displaying 
the activity and unity of self-determination. Combining causal necessity with the 
logical independence of cause and effect, Hegel presents causality as a relation or 
proportion (Verhältnis) that maps logically independent substances within a world-
order.25 
In considering being as all that is, existence is distinct from its essence—the 
“actual,” as Burbidge describes it vis-à-vis considerations on reflection, "includes 
 
25 Terry Pinkard describes the self-positing system wherein self-reflexivity depends on referring to 
categories other than itself, and thus universal transpire as categories of conceptual thought. Hegel's Dialectic 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 77—78. 
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the sense that its essence has been actualized," wherein this essence is now 
deemed "possibility."26 When considered by itself, an isolated condition or 
possibility cannot produce a concrete actual but must be combined, becoming 
really possible—once this happens, the actual must become actual and cannot 
persist as possibility. Relative to these particular conditions, the actual has 
become necessary, a relative necessity, contingent on the peculiar circumstances 
of a distinctive situation. It follows that the absolutely actual is the total interplay 
of real actualities and real possibilities, which are taken as components of a whole. 
Taken under reflection, the self-constituting dynamic mode that characterizes the 
actual, which determines itself, unfolds as “absolutely necessary,” i.e., “its own 
ground.”27 Reflecting on this reflection, however, we see that the realm of the 
accident inheres in substance—the power of this movement, revealed in this 
dynamic flux between absolute necessity and accidentality, is due to how 
substance "can only be substance to the extent that it does acquire the form of 
accidentality.”28 Accidents disappear and are replaced by others, as substance 
obtains by acquiring the form of accidentality, with reciprocal interaction between 
causes and events pushing along existence and appearance in actuality, just as 
being and nothing interacted in the process of becoming: 
“The actual is what realizes its essence, having transcended the distinction between 
the essential and the inessential, between essence and existence, between 
appearance and the thing in itself. Now the actual has turned out to be a dynamic 
of mutual interaction in which each of its moments is both active and passive with 
respect to each other moment. And that reciprocity binds the whole together into 
a distinctive unity."29  
There are three moments comprising actuality: i) formal modality, or 
contingency); ii) real modality, or relative necessity; ii) and absolute necessity (SL 
478).30 Insofar as the result of modal actuality is concerned, absolute necessity, as 
 
26 John Burbidge, The Logic of Hegel’s Logic (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 76. 
27 Ibid., 77. 
28 Ibid., 77 [emphasis added]. 
29 Ibid., 79. 
30 “Actuality, as itself immediate form-unity of inner and outer, is thus in the determination of 
immediacy as against the determination of immanent reflection; or it is an actuality as against a possibility. 
The connection of the two to each other is the third, the actual determined both as being reflected into itself 
and as this being immediately existing. This third is necessity. But first, since the actual and the possible are 
formal distinctions, their connection is likewise only formal, and consists only in this, that the one just like 
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the transparency of being-to-itself, reveals being as absolute contradiction with 
itself without invalidating the prior two moments—of formal modality, 
“dominated by contingency”; and of real modality, “dominated by relative 
necessity”—but, instead, subsuming them in revealing their truth.31 Relative 
necessity, which displays itself in “real” actuality, possibility, and necessity, reflects 
the “stable-instability,” or “unstable-stability,” of a being that presents itself insofar 
as it is taken up by the critical activity in which it is thought. Contingency is 
constitutive of the process of actualization but real modality extinguishes what 
formal modality can not—"the complete determination of possibility and 
actuality in accordance with sheer chance.”32 Longuenesse describes the 
processual relation of the possible to the actual, delineating the unity of some 
“thing and its conditions as the fundamental structure in which all things are 
thought” while warning against any temporal conceptualization.33 
“In the back-and-forth movement between actuality and possibility, what we have 
is not the mere flip-flop between determinate existence and formal ground, but a 
dissection and reconstitution of the object. Possibility is nothing other than actuality 
itself, dissociated into its elements, the ‘manifold of determinate being,’ and 
actuality is nothing other than possibility returned to determinate unity.”34 
Transitioning from the moments of formal modality into real modality (real 
actuality, possibility, necessity) we see that, in order to be considered actual, the 
Concept for Hegel need not depend on intuitions given external to thought. 
Hegel does not dismiss the empirical element and lapse into rationalist thought 
either, however, as he underscores that real actuality is actuality that “has a 
content,” and is “the thing of many properties, the concretely existing world ... an 
in-itself and immanent reflection ... its externality is an inner relating only to 
itself ” (SL 482). The empirical, taken up by reflection without remainder, is 
always determined by thought but committed to concrete empirical existence. Real 
 
the other is a positedness, or in contingency. Second, because in contingency the actual as well as the 
possible are a positedness, because they have retained their determination, real actuality now arises, and 
with it also real possibility and relative necessity. Third, the reflection of relative necessity into itself yields 
absolute necessity, which is absolute possibility and actuality.” (SL 478) 
31 Béatrice Longuenesse, “Actuality in Hegel's Logic,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 13, no. 1 (1998): 
121. 
32 Ng, Life, 162. 
33 Longuenesse, Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 137. 
34 Ibid. 
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possibility, consequently, presents the totality of actual circumstances and actual 
conditions which bring about some event or thing, such that one may only look 
towards actuality in order to find real possibility. For Hegel, it is only once all the 
conditions of something are completely manifest/present that it proceeds into 
actuality (SL 483). Hegel states that “[w]hat is actual can act” (SL 482). Formal 
actuality is immediate, unreflected actuality, which cannot act because its 
determinations determine things as solely possible, and thus tethered to the realm 
of contingency. Real actuality expresses the thing it-self as thought (Sache selbst), 
as existence that is reflected—the unity of the inner and outer—i.e., existence 
that can act because its relationship(s) with other things have the status of concrete 
thought-determinations, these relationships determined as actual by thought. 
Real actuality contains the empirical as a moment within itself, it is empirical 
existence as reflected existence where the empirical and reflected are brought 
together.  
Insofar as conditions, i.e., conditioned ground, plays a role, it is one wherein 
the conditions correspond to completeness: 
“the completeness of the conditions is the totality as in the content, and the fact is 
itself this content determined as being equally actual as possible. In the sphere of 
the conditioned ground, the conditions have the form (that is, the ground or the 
reflection that stands on its own) outside them, and it is this form that makes them 
moments of the fact and elicits concrete existence in them …. immediate actuality 
is not determined to be condition by virtue of a presupposing reflection, but the 
supposition is rather that the immediate actuality is itself the possibility” (SL 483).  
Similarly, in the Encyclopedia, Hegel notes that: “[w]hen all conditions are present, 
the matter must become actual” (E §147). Given a certain set of conditions, a 
certain actuality necessarily follows—real possibility is already real necessity, for 
the totality of conditions is identical with realized actuality. Hegel heeds the role 
of contingency in the determination of the actual. Necessity as such remains, 
“[f]or it has a presupposition from which it begins; it takes its start from the 
contingent” (SL 549).  
Per Hegel’s modal metaphysics, actuality generates a concept of identity from 
recognition that the negativity of essence is as the same time the being of essence. 
Essence (Wesen) is an identity-relation; as that which being is not, essence reveals 
what being is via apophatic alterity. This movement against being takes the form 
of ‘A is A’—the immediacy of being is reflected into itself.  
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Following Brown’s formulation, a subject is only understood to be identical 
with itself if it posits difference alongside the identity of itself in the predicate 
position. ‘A’ is equal to itself (A=A) because it does not require anything other 
than itself—yet the form that ‘A’ must take as the confirmation of its own identity 
requires reflection, which necessitates absolute difference. Thus, identity self-
subsists but also depends on its own negativity. Difference is more comprehensive 
than identity because it contains the form of identity and the identity of the 
negation.  
Hegel’s Actuality offers that possibility is as much about non-actuality as it is 
about actuality. Contra the dominant aforementioned readings, Brown notes 
that, “[i]f Hegel means that contingency is only one of many necessary concepts, 
necessity turns out to be more primary than contingency, in the sense that all 
concepts are of necessity and come from necessary developments. In contrast to 
necessity, contingency plays only a marginal role as merely one of these necessary 
concepts.”35 Brown presents his account as “robustly dialectical,” designating it 
the “Dialectical Totality Interpretation,” which extols the mutually transitive 
aspect of necessity and contingency. Seeing his framework as a kindred spirit to 
the good infinite, Brown’s Dialectical Totality affirms contradiction as the most 
inclusive relation possible, reifying what Hegel terms the “true infinite”—the 
“self-sublation of this infinite and of the finite in one process” (SL 109), i.e., the 
process in which the finite passes turns into its other. As the true infinite starts 
from the self-sublating finite, therein starting from itself, its power is manifest 
from “sustaining contingent finitude above and despite its possible non-being.”36 
Here we are reminded of Hegel’s presuppositionless opening, as this formulation 
heralds how being and nothing form totality through negation, where the 
exhaustion and completion of all determinate possibilities is the result of alterity. 
The question thus becomes how to conceive of finitude/the limit along a modal 
register—Brown takes this up, noting that “[t]he reason why the good infinite is 
truly limitless is not because it succeeds at divorcing itself from the finite, but 
because by including the genuinely finite, there is no other position that could 
possibly stand against it in exterior contrast [….] it includes the finite as an 
 
35 Nahum Brown, Hegel’s Actuality Chapter of the Science of Logic (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019), 79. 
36 Robert Williams, “Hegel’s Recasting of the Theological Proofs” in The Palgrave Hegel Handbook, ed. 
Kenneth Westphal and Marina Bykova (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020), 360. 
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exterior which is and is not an exterior."37 This conception of Dialectical Totality 
affirms that, since contradiction always includes the other, to be other than the 
relation that includes the positive and negative together is already included within 
it. 
Brown argues that when we talk about the necessity of contingency, we should 
also discuss the contingency of necessity favoring possibility and, accordingly, 
emphasizes the mutually transitive aspect of necessity and contingency. Brown 
believes that the traditional reading overemphasizes the necessity of contingency 
and, by this, the traditional reading comes is ignorant to the mutual transitional 
movement from contingency to necessity and vice versa, because the traditional 
reading prioritizes necessity and reads contingency as one of the other necessary 
concepts of the Logic. Brown argues that recognizing the mutual transition 
complements the incomplete argument of these traditional readings by adding 
that not only is contingency necessary in Hegel’s system, but also necessity is 
contingent. For Brown, such a robust dialectic between contingency and necessity 
completes the conclusions given in the traditional readings.  
Brown’s intervention finds its culmination in a two-fold conception of 
possibility: a positive side, where that which is possible can become actual; a negative 
side, where something can remain merely possible as the possibility not to be. Brown 
argues that “the negative side of possibility—that what is possible can also not 
be—plays a significant role in Hegel’s modal argument” and “[t]he actualization 
of possibility leads to a productive contradiction” for, since this contradiction 
cannot be sustained, Hegel’s modal reality takes on a developmental structure in 
which actuality expands to include the concrete existence of the totality of 
possibility.38 The argument that “actuality expands to include the totality of 
possibility” is, for Brown, the grounding for a one-world vision of modality.39 This 
implicitly call to mind an alternate to David Lewis’ modal realism, according to 
which the world we are part of is but one of a plurality of (possible) worlds, with 
each world actual to itself and merely possible to all other worlds, such that 
actuality is relative. Grafting the instrumentalization of facts and laws into our 
world, Brown’s tripartite model illustrates how thought attempts to realize the 
 
37 Brown, Actuality, 69. 
38 Brown, Hegel on Possibility, 105. 
39 Ibid. 
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actuality of the possible: 
1) Formal contingency—actuality includes its opposite through the strategy 
of indifference; this is the negative side of possibility, the “what could have 
been.”40 
2) Real or conditional actualization—actuality eventually realizes itself by 
making use of conditions, which are both actuality and possibility at the 
same time; due to the law of non-contradiction, actualization is unable to 
sustain both contraries of possibility, and, “[b]ecause what is actual is 
possible, actuality cannot only be one side or the other of the possible, but 
must come to form itself as the totality of possibility.”41  
3) Absolute actuality—explores the modal ramifications of substance, which 
is simultaneously actuality and possibility, or substance as an actuality that 
is explicitly both sides of possibility together, i.e., both this particular and 
its universal instantiation This is related to Hegel’s relation of substantiality, 
the relation of absolute conversion between actuality and possibility as 
“actuosity” (Actuosität). What is actualized “is the absolute conversion of 
actuality and possibility into each other, an actuality that completely 
sustains itself in possibility […] but only by becoming the other of itself.”42   
All three models fail to completely present an actuality of the possible itself 
but succeed in partially expressing the inherent contradictions riddling modal 
reality. For Brown, Hegel’s groundbreaking and controversial conclusion about 
modality is that actuality must be able to express both sides of possibility at once 
(A ∧ ¬A). Despite the actuality of both sides of possibility leads to an unresolvable 
modal paradox at first glance, the conflicting sides of possibility stand together 
through the division of what is and what could have been.  
Formal actuality is the starting point of modal reality in analogous fashion to 
how being is the presuppositionless and indeterminate foundation for the 
development of determinate meaning. Reality here requires the existence of 
unactualized possibilities as part of the constitution of what makes it true 
(actuality), but it is thought-determination that does the heavy metaphysical 
lifting. For Brown, possibility functions as the reflection of actuality itself. Brown’s 
 
40 Ibid., 108. 
41 Ibid., 127. 
42 Ibid., 129. 
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Hegel here recalls Aristotle’s book Theta of the Metaphysics, where actuality is 
conceptually prior and more primary than the possible. Beginning his modal 
analysis with actuality, Brown sees possibility as the in-itself and the reflection of 
actuality.  
Brown implicitly theorizes actualization out of possibilities—this reading 
emphasizes possibility over actuality, a position that Hegel simply cannot hold 
because actuality is always prior to possibility and possibilities are but moments 
in actuality. The priority of actuality over possibility, when taken not only as an 
argumentative aspect of Hegel’s text but also as the metaphysical makeup of 
actuality, prohibits the idea of actualization out of possibilities. If actuality 
emerges out of possibilities, the actual had to presuppose its possibilities, i.e. 
possibilities had to be prior to actuality. This does not fit Hegel’s position. Even 
(charitably) reading Brown’s interpretation of actualization as producing a modal 
version of Hegel’s arguments for real actuality, this would still not amount to 
actualization out of possibilities. Real actuality emerges from conditions, which 
are themselves actuals but recognized by the conditioned actual as its own 
possibilities. 
Brown outlines a notion of possibility as a degree of quantity: “possibilities are 
at first dispersed in others and are actualized through conditions.”43 This 
presentation of Hegel’s modal priority offers a dialectical co-primacy between 
actuality and possibility, where both are in different respects prior to the other.44 
Moving from thought to substance, Brown takes Hegel’s conception of substance 
as an actuality that explicitly assumes both sides of possibility—e.g., both this 
particular rose and the universal instantiation of ‘rose.’ It follows, interpreting Brown, 
that possibilities necessarily exist as part of substance but, because of the 
movement inherent to inclusive necessity with the concrete universal, Hegel’s 
notion of unactualized possibility is not relegated to some static category but 
mobile, wherein actuality and possibility become unified.  
The traditional reading of Hegel’s dialectic between absolute necessity and 
contingency affirms that Hegel ultimately recognizes the concept of contingency 
 
43 Ibid., 166. 
44 Traditional, non-dialectical accounts of modality (e.g., Leibniz’ logical conception of the nature of 
substance) avoid this contradiction by lowering the ontological status of unactualized possibility to non-
actuality while categorically separating actuality and possibility from each other. 
 EKIN ERKAN 191 
as a necessary element of his system. Brown pushes for a more radical conclusion 
that draws from the being-to-nothingness transition to contradiction and from 
this to Hegel’s modal argument. For Brown, Hegel’s absolute necessity proposes 
a reasoning of why things cannot be otherwise, because everything has already 
been included in absolute contingency: the inclusive nature of contradiction is 
captured in the modal theory of the Actuality chapter wherein to include the 
negative (¬A) alongside the positive (A) is of absolute necessity because ‘A is non-
A’ anticipates every possible permutation in every which way of ‘A.’ 
Brown’s program is emblematic of the error that accompanies conflating 
Hegel’s account as conclusively Aristotelian. This results in a confusion regarding 
the relation of actuality to possibility. How could it be the case that thought 
actualizes possibilities if actuality is prior to possibility? Such a reading trades on 
a fallacy of equivocation—to actualize possibilities inevitably presupposes the 
prior presence of possibility to actuality. That is, there must be at least a possibility 
before being actual that thought actualizes it. Brown’s program indeed belongs 
to Aristotle. For Aristotle, actuality is prior to potentialities yet Aristotle also 
argues that actuality is always actualized potentialities.45 Indeed, insofar as 
Hegel’s modal treatment (formal, real, absolute) is concerned, he consistently 
argues for the priority of actuality over possibility. Consequently, Hegel does not 
use the term “actualization” and “actualization of possibility,” because there is no 
such thing for Hegel. Actuality simply determines itself through its negativity (i.e., 
possibility) and this is the self-determining “life-blood” from which its movement 
unspools.  
Hegel’s logic avoids presupposing possibility’s being prior to actuality insofar 
as actuality and the derivation of possibility is considered as the in-itselfness of 
actuality, an implicit inner moment whereby actuality further determines itself. 
Actuality is immediate yet derived as an identity from the logic of  inner and outer 
(SL 464). If actuality as immediacy is explicit/outer, then its opposition, its 
implicitness/innerness, has to be possibility in the logic of modality. In order to 
conceive of actuality as existence, and particularly as an emerging process, we must 
already conceive the problem of presupposing an alien form within the logic of 
 
45 Giorgio Agamben is one of the philosophers who identifies this as an ambiguity, yet a productive one. 
Homo Sacer, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 42. 
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actuality.  
Remarking on the distinction between actuality and existence clarified at the 
beginning of the section, Hegel, in the Zusatz to §6 of the “Introduction” of the 
Encyclopedia Logic remarks: “I dealt with actuality too in a quite elaborate Logic, 
and I distinguished it . . . from being-there [Dasein], from existence, and from 
other determinations.” Actuality, by virtue of containing in-itselfness and 
reflection-within-itself, is not existence as such; this “containing” allows an actual 
to be self-subsistent. As enumerated in the logic of existence, an existent thing 
subsists solely in its properties. This produces a conceptual difference between 
actuality and existence. What Brown eludes is that the actual operates as a 
possible in another actual insofar as an actual can only be possible in relation to 
another actual—the actual thereby plays a constitutive role in the emergence of 
another actual; “[t]his actuality, therefore, which constitutes the possibility of a 
fact, is not its own possibility but the in-itself of an other actual” (SL 483). The 
relation of actuals formulate a conditioning relation where the possibilities of an 
actual are taken as the conditions out of which the actual comes to be. 
In short, the actual actualizes itself.46 That is, the only thing an actual does is to 
manifest itself. Its manifestation is its actualization, for it “just manifests itself, and 
this means that in its externality, and only in it, it is itself, that is to say, only as a 
self-differentiating and self-determining movement” (SL 478). There is but a fine 
line between absolute possibility and formal possibility—Brown's conception risks 
collapsing absolute possibility with formal possibility (the possibility of A and non-
A). Absolute possibility for Hegel is the emptiness in the determinations of 
absolute actuality, and not only the possibility of A ∧ ¬A. Hegel remarks that 
“[t]his emptiness of its determination makes it into a mere possibility, one which 
can just as well be an other and is determined as possibility” (SL 486) Although 
this evokes the thought that formal possibility is the possibility of A and ¬A, Hegel 
further notes: “[b]ut this possibility is itself absolute possibility, for it is precisely 
the possibility of being equally determined as possibility and actuality” (ibid). It 
is here that Hegel differentiates formal possibility from absolute possibility, for 
formal possibility (A ∧ ¬A) is not an actuality.  
 
46 This may sound like a tautology but, for Hegel, there exists no such thought as there does in Leibniz, 
where possibilities are concealed potentialities of the actuals and the inner is the necessary ground of the 
outer, i.e., of all external relations. 
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Hegel further remarks that “[i]t is necessity itself, therefore, that determines 
itself as contingency: in its being it repels itself from itself, in this very repelling 
has only returned to itself, and in this turning back which is its being has repelled 
itself from itself ” (SL 487). Here, it is explicit that absolute possibility is that which 
mediates absolute actuality and makes it contingency. That is, absolute possibility 
turns immediacy (absolute actuality) into a positedness of the immediacy 
(actuality) and in-itselfness (possibility), or into contingency. This occurs precisely in 
the same way that necessity turns immediacy into a positedness, the positedness 
of immediacy (actuality) and in-itselfness (possibility). What makes something 
absolutely necessary is not only its inclusive nature of A and ¬A but its mediating 
force, which makes actuality explicit as the unity of itself and possibility or 
contingency. Consequently, Hegel claims that absolute necessity determines itself 
as contingency, for it operates over actuality precisely as contingency does. 
Nonetheless, formal possibility is not necessity and it cannot even transition into 
necessity—for it is but so radically indeterminate that it is itself indifferent to the 
distinction between A and ¬A. Indeed, contingency accounts for their difference 
and to necessity accounts for their identity. 
This is precisely why, unlike contingency and necessity, absolute necessity 
“barely leaves any independent meaning to the determinations of actuality and 
possibility.”47 The concept of absolute necessity reflects the thing itself, completely 
described under the unity of its determinations—i.e., real wirklich, the unity of a 
totality of determinations—and the unity of its own conditions, which is, at once, 
also constituted by the unity of conditions. Absolute necessity absorbs itself in the 
previous categories of contingency and necessity and its prior modes of modal 
reflection—actuality and possibility—caught in its process of "tarrying." The 
contingency that real necessity contains “in itself ” is that of immediate existence, 
of conditions. That which becomes in it is that of the unity of  conditions, or absolute 
actuality. Indeed, these two contingencies are actually one, as they reflect the 
dependence of reflection with respect to a presupposition/exteriority. The 
diametric opposition of formal actuality and possibility break down in the 
determination of the contingent, as actuality and possibility become equipollent: 
the actual determining the range of the possible such that what is actual is 
 
47 Longuenesse, Hegel’s Critique, 148. 
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possible and what is possible is the actual.  
Dialectical inferences are distinct from paradoxical deductions and being and 
nothing, which pass into each other, are not the true Concept/the Idea—the true 
Concept, i.e., the truth about being and nothing, is becoming, which is the 
movement between the two and their unity, and is distinct from them. Insofar as 
absolute actuality deals with embedded conditions, we must take into account 
that “the many is not many, it is one” and that the concept of the many “turns 
round into” the concept of the one, “being into non-being”, “identity into non-
identity” such that what is true must always take into consideration the 
simultaneous reciprocal—what Ficara terms, the “turning round into each other” 
of contradictory conceptual determinations.48 Real actuality is the determination 
of the real as thought, of the real as reflected existence—the empirical and the 
reflected are no longer held in isolation. More broadly, given Hegel’s view on life 
as an a priori schema, this picture of actuality corresponds to how cognitive 
capacities are fundamentally shaped by corporeal reality and the relation to the 
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